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THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES: UT RES
MAGIS PEREAT QUAM VALEAT
In Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles in 1919,
Germany renounced all rights in her overseas possessions in favor of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; among these possessions
was German South West Africa. In 1920, this territory was entrusted
to the Union of South Africa under a mandate conferred upon the
King of England, pursuant to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations.1 The Mandates System established in Article 22 of the
Covenant was a novel alternative to the historical practice of annexa-
tion of the territories of nations defeated in war. It was only after
heated debate and the vigorous advocacy of President Woodrow
Wilson that the Allied Powers embraced the principles of the system.2
The Mandates System was based on the ideal that advanced nations
should undertake to carry out a "sacred trust of civilization" to pro-
mote the "well-being and development" of "peoples not yet able to
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world." ' The essential terms of the "sacred trust" were broadly
stated in Article 2, pargaraph 2, of the Mandate for German South
West Africa: "The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the
material and moral well-being and the social progress of the in-
habitants of the territory subject to the present Mandate."
Following the dissolution of the League of Nations after the
Second World War, it became the stated intention of the South
African government to' incorporate the mandated territory into the
Union. This, however, was unacceptable to the General Assembly of
the United Nations.' Subsequently, when the Trusteeship System 5
was instituted, the Union of South Africa was the only mandatory
which refused to yield its dominion over a mandated territory. Be-
cause of the demise of the organization which had created the Man-
dates System and the refusal of the Union to place South West Africa
lIt is noteworthy that South West Africa was one of the territories:
which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or
their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical con-
tinuity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances can be
best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of
its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of
the indigenous population.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 6. (Emphasis added.) Among the"laws" of the Union of South Africa are those which establish and enforce the policy
known as apartheid, the segregation of the races.
2 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 217 (second phase).
3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1.
4 International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 142-43 (advisory
opinion).
5 The trusteeship system was established by the U.N. CHARTER ch. XII; it applied
to territories still under Mandate at the end of World War II.
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under the Trusteeship System, the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice on the status of the Territory.'
In 1950, the Court ruled that the Mandate had survived the dis-
solution of the League and that, consequently, two obligations under
the Mandate remained in force: 1) to "promote to the utmost the
material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabi-
tants"; 2) to submit annual reports on the administration of the
Territory and to transmit petitions from the indigenous peoples to
the United Nations General Assembly, in lieu of the League Council.'
Significantly, the Court also ruled that, by virtue of Article 37 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice" and Article 80(1) of
the Charter of the United Nations,' Article 7 of the Mandate"0 was
still in force; therefore, the Union of South Africa would be obliged to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as successor to the
Permanent Court of International Justice."
The cases which are the subject matter of this Comment were
brought before the International Court of Justice on November 4, 1960,
by the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, two former members of
the League of Nations.'2 The substance of their claims was that, inter
6 International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 129 (advisory opinion.)
7Id. at 133, 136.
8 I.C.J. STAT. art. 37, provides:
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for references of a matter
to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the
parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.
9 U.N. CHARTER art. 80, para. 1, provides:
Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements under
Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system,
and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall
be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever
of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments
to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.
10 MANDATE FOR GEa -N SOUTH WEST AFiCA, art. 7, para. 2, 2 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFF. J. 89 (1921), provides:
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between
the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to
the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such
dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations.
1 International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.CJ. 138 (advisory opinion).
The Court also held that there was no obligation to place the territory under a trustee-
ship. Id. at 144.
12Although Ethiopia and Liberia filed separate applications, they were treated
as a single party for the purpose of choosing a judge ad hoc and may be regarded
as a single party for the purpose of the litigation. South West Africa Cases, [1962]
I.C.J. 321 (preliminary objections). If the bench does not include a judge of the
nationality of one or both of the parties to a case, such party or parties may choose
an ad hoc judge to sit on the case. I.C.J. STAT. ch. 1.
For the background of the litigation, see generally The South West Africa Cases:
A Symposium, 4 COLUM. J. INT'L L. 47 (1965) and authorities cited therein. For a
political science viewpoint of the litigation, see D'Amato, Legal and Political Strate-
gies of the South West Africa Litigation, 4 L. ix TRANsoN Q. 8 (1967).
1967]
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alia, the pursuit of apartheid was violative of the obligations which
the Union of South Africa had undertaken as Mandatory of South
West Africa. On November 3, 1961, the government of the Union
filed four preliminary objections. 3
In rejecting the preliminary objections of the Union, the Court
held the following: 1) that the Mandate, notwithstanding the dis-
solution of the League, was a "treaty or convention in force" within
the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court, and that the
validity of Article 7 of the Mandate was not affected by the dis-
solution; 2) that the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia qualified
as "another Member of the League of Nations" within the meaning
of Article 7, despite the fact that the League had ceased to exist;
3) that there was a "dispute" within the meaning of Article 7 despite
the fact that the material interests of the applicants were not involved;
4) that the dispute before the Court was one which "cannot be settled
by negotiation" within the meaning of Article 7. On the basis of
these conclusions the Court found that it had "jurisdiction to ad-
judicate upon the merits of the dispute." '1
Although the Court in 1962, in rejecting the preliminary objec-
tions, had decided that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of
the case even though only non-material interests were involved, the
Court in 1966, in the second phase of the case, held that the applicants'
claims were inadmissible because the Mandate was never intended to
confer substantive rights on members of the League of Nations where
the material interests of the States were not involved."
THE 1966 DEcISION
The Court in 1966 framed the question of admissibility thus:
[T]here was one matter that appertained to the merits of
the case but which had an antecedent character, namely the
question of the Applicants' standing in the present phase of
the proceedings-not, that is to say, of their standing before
the Court itself, which was the subject of the Court's decision
in 1962, but the question, as a matter of the merits of the
case, of their legal right or interest regarding the subject-
matter of their claim, as set out in their final submissions.' 6
The Court then distinguished between two kinds of provisions con-
tained in the mandates: the "conduct" provisions and the "special
interests" provisions. The former, according to the Court, related
to the carrying out of the mandates as mandates. These were "articles
defining the Mandatory's powers, and obligations in respect of the
-13 South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. 326-27 (preliminary objections).
14 Id. at 347.
15 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 6 (second phase).
16 Id. at 18.
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inhabitants of the territory and towards the League and its organs." "
These so-called "conduct" provisions were the heart of the "sacred
trust." The "special interests" provisions, on the other hand, were
those provisions conferring material benefits "directly upon the mem-
bers of the League as individual States, or in favour of their na-
tionals." 18 In regard to the Mandate for South West Africa, there
was but one "special interests" provision, in Article 5, which estab-
lished the rights of "all missionaries, nationals of any State Member
of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the
territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling." 19
Having thus defined its terms, the Court then posed the question:
whether, according to the scheme of the mandates and of
the mandates system as a whole, any legal right or interest
. . .was vested in the members of the League of Nations,
including the present Applicants, individually and each in its
own separate right to call for the carrying out of the man-
dates as regards their "conduct" clauses;--or whether this
function must, rather, be regarded as having appertained ex-
clusively to the League itself, and not to each and every
member State, separately and independently. In other words,
the question is whether the various mandatories had any
direct obligation towards the other members of the League
individually, as regards the carrying out of the "conduct"
provisions of the mandates2
The Court concluded that, even when the League of Nations still
existed, the Applicants did not, in their individual capacity as States,
possess any separate right which they could assert, independent of, or in
addition to, the right of the League, in pursuit of its collective, in-
stitutional activity, to require the due performance of the Mandate in
discharge of the "sacred trust." 21
In the Court's view, the function of the League in regard to the
"conduct" provisions of the Mandate precluded individual members
of the League from claiming substantive rights which would enable
them to compel enforcement of the Mandatory's "conduct" obligations.
Adverting to the "juridical character and structure" of the League
of Nations, the Court found one element of primary importance to be
that Article 2 of the Covenant provided that the "action of the League
17Id. at 20.
Is Ibid.
19 Mandate for Germn South West Africa, art. 5, 2 LEAGuE OF NATIONS OFF. J.
89 (1921). Article 5 of the Mandate was also a "conduct!' provision in the sense that
it created a duty in the Mandatory to "ensure in the territory freedom of conscience
and the free exercise of all forms of worship." Ibid.
2o South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.j. 22 (second phase). (Emphasis added.)
211d. at 29.
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under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of
an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat." ' If
the relationship between the League and the Mandatory was to be
effectuated through the League Council, it followed, arguably, that
League members did not have individual rights in the general obliga-
tions under the Mandate, absent some provision in the Covenant to
that effect.' This institutional set-up, coupled with the fact that under
Article 22 of the Covenant the tutelage was to be exercised by the
mandatories "on behalf of the League," suggested to the Court that
the responsibility for the mandates resided in the League as a whole.
Furthermore, in the third paragraph of the preamble of the Mandate
for South West Africa, His Britannic Majesty, on behalf of the Union
of South Africa, had agreed to accept the Mandate and exercise it "on
behalf of the league," not, the Court pointed out, on any other behalf. 4
The Court further noted that Article 22, paragraph 1 of the
Covenant provided that "securities for the performance" of the sacred
trust were to be "embodied in the Covenant." 25 But the Covenant
contained no security in the form of a substantive right in the indi-
vidual Members of the League to enforce the Mandatory's duties to
the inhabitants under the Mandate, or a right of recourse to the Court."
Apart from the jurisdictional clause, the individual Members of the
League were mentioned only in connection with the "special interests"
provisions of the various mandates; these provisions establish the only
direct link between the Mandatory and the individual members of
the League.2
In the "conduct" provisions, moreover, there existed a link be-
tween the Mandatory and the League and its organs. In the Court's
view, the function of the members of the League in regard to the
"sacred trust" was to activate the organs of the League to whom the
Mandatory was responsible. The only means of enforcing the sacred
trust was through the League Council, to which the Mandatory was
required to make annual reports under Article 6 of the Mandate. In







2 There followed an enumeration of the securities for the performance of the
sacred trust which were embodied in the Covenant, among which were the duty to
furnish annual reports to the satisfaction of the Council of the League and the estab-
lishment of a Permanent Mandates Commission. Id. at 25.
26 The Court continually evinced a reluctance to expose the Mandatory to ob-
obligations which it had not expressly and unequivocally assumed. Compare this
narrow, contractual approach with that of the Court in its 1950 opinion on Inter-
national Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128.
27 "[T]he Mandatory . . . shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State
Member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory
for the purpose of prosecuting their calling." MANDATE FOR GERMAN SOUTH WEST
AFRicA, art 5, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 89 (1921).
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Council for "any modification of the terms of the . . .Mandate"; "
the consent of the individual members of the League was not required.
The Court also observed-perhaps to illustrate the voluntary or
political nature of the obligations under the Mandate-that the Council
could never have imposed its views upon an unwilling mandatory be-
cause of the "unanimity rule."
In the Council, which the mandatory was entitled to attend
as a member for the purpose of any mandate entrusted to it,
if not otherwise a member-(Article 4, paragraph 5, of the
Covenant), the vote of the mandatory, if present at the
meeting, was necessary for any actual "decision" of the
Council, since unanimity of those attending was the basic
voting rule on matters of substance in the main League
organs-(Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant). Thus
there could never be any formal clash between the mandatory
and the Council as such.2
The Court also pointed to the power of the Council to seek an advisory
opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice, a decision
which would not, of course, be binding on the Mandatory. In the
context of these procedures, the Court found "out of place" the
existence of substantive rights for individual members of
the League in the conduct of the mandates (particularly if
backed up by a right of recourse to the Court) exercisable
independently of the Council at the will of the member State.30
Thus, the Mandate was interpreted as a document of limited enforce-
ability. The existence of rights which might bind the Mandatory
against its will was inconsistent with the obligations assumed there-
under, save in regard to the "special interests" provisions.3'
That the resulting decision rendered the "sacred trust of civiliza-
tion" unenforceable did not unduly trouble the Court.
2
3 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 28 (second phase).
29 Id. at 44.
30 Id. at 45. It is difficult to see how it follows from the fact that certain obli-
gations of the Mandatory were not enforceable in one manner-through the League
Council-that these obligations were also not enforceable before the Court.
31 The plain fact is that, in relation to the "conduct" provisions of the man-
dates, it was never the intention that the Council should be able to impose its
views on the various mandatories-the system adopted was one which de-
liberately rendered this impossible. It was never intended that the views of
the Court should be ascertained in a manner binding on mandatories, or that
mandatories should be answerable to individual League members as such in
respect to the "conduct" provisions of the mandates.
South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 46 (second phase). This language refers to
"ascertaining" the "views" of the Court, not to enforcing international obligations or
to applying international norms or standards. This suggests a value judgment as
to the role of the Court in the ultimate issue on the merits of the case, as well as a
limited conception of the scope of the rule of law in the international area.
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In the international field, the existence of obligations that
cannot in the last resort be enforced by any legal process,
has always been the rule rather than the exception-and
this was even more the case in 1920 than today.
32
Similarly, the Court stated that the risk that a mandatory might
administer its mandate contrary to the wishes of the Council, and in
contempt of the mandate, was a risk "evidently taken with open
eyes." ' The fact that here the obligations of the Mandatory were
made nugatory by the Court's decision was preferable to the applicants'
contention, which
would involve acceptance of the proposition that even if the
Council of the League should be perfectly satisfied with the
way in which a mandatory was carrying out its mandate, any
individual member of the League could independently invoke
the jurisdiction of the Court in order to have the same
conduct declared illegal, although, as mentioned earlier, no
provision for recourse to the Court was included amongst
the "securities" provided for by the Covenant itself.
34
The Court here envisioned a parade of horribles: a multiplicity of
suits brought by the Members of the League-"some 40 or 50 inde-
pendent centres of invigilatory rights" 3 -each action badgering the
Mandatory with an individual notion of what system might better
serve the inhabitants of the Territory.36 This fear, coupled with the
fact that the League Council might have approved fully of the
administration of the mandate under attack, led the Court to conclude
that this result was neither what the framers of the mandates had
intended nor what this Mandatory had agreed to.
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF THE 1962 JUDGMENT
At first blush, it seems that the Court reversed itself in 1966."
7
There is, however, a difference between the questions decided in 1962
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 46-47.
35 Id. at 31.
36 This vision assumes, however, the lack of a sufficient legal standard which the
Court might apply without interfering with the discretionary power of the Mandatory.
With such a standard, the individual views of the member States would not be relevant.
Furthermore, the fact that the League Council might be satisfied with the admini-
stration is irrelevant as well, if it were the intention of the parties to the Mandate
that the Court should apply legal standards to the Mandatory's conduct.
37 The following excerpt from an editorial in the New York Times International
Edition serves to illustrate the popular response:
One reason why the decision will provoke enduring argument among law-
yers is the remarkable 7-to-
7 deadlock of the justices on so important a case.
This required the vote of the Court's president, Sir Percy C. Spender of
Australia, to produce a verdict, which in effect reversed a previous verdict
of the same court on the same case.
N.Y. Times Int'l Ed., July 21, 1966, p. 4, col. 1.
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and in 1966. In order to understand the difference between the scope
of the two judgments, the following distinctions should be made.
The jurisdictional question raised by the respondent's third pre-
liminary objection in 1962 may be posed thus: whether the applicant
States were those intended to have a right to be before the Court
pursuant to the jurisdictional clause (Article 7(2)) in regard to
whatever substantive rights might be embodied in the Mandate.
Specifically, the question before the Court was whether this right could
be defeated because the dispute involved solely the non-material in-
terests of the applicants. The question is perhaps properly termed one
of subject-matter jurisdiction,' involving an interpretation of Article 7.
The question before the Court in 1966, involving the admissibility
of the claims may be posed thus: whether the parties having standing
before the Court to invoke the substantive provisions of the Mandate
were vested with a right of action in the particular substantive pro-
visions raised. This issue assumed locus standi under Article 7. The
question is one of substance concerning the legal content of the
provisions of the Mandate, especially Article 2.
A threshhold inquiry is whether the respondent's third prelim-
inary objection in 1962 was one fairly termed jurisdictional by the
1966 Court, or whether its substantive emanations-that is to say, the
extent to which it raised an issue necessarily involving and requiring
an examination of the substantive provisions of the Mandate-con-
stituted an adjudication of the admissibility of the claim. 9
The Court in 1962 did in fact consider the Mandate as a whole
in determining the scope of the jurisdictional clause. The Court
viewed Article 7 and the actions which could be brought pursuant
thereto as "the final bulwark of protection by recourse to the Court
against possible abuse or breaches of the Mandate." o Clearly, it had
the full gamut of the Mandatory's obligations in mind, not the least of
which were the obligations to the inhabitants contained in Article 2 "to
promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the
inhabitants." Furthermore, in considering the respondent's third pre-
liminary objection, the Court in 1962 determined that there was
subject-matter jurisdiction, apparently assuming that the claims were
admissible. Indeed, the language of the Court suggests that support
for this assumption was found in Article 7 itself.
38 See I ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRAcTIcE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CoURT 327-28
(1965) (conferment of jurisdiction ratione inateriae) [hereinafter cited as ROSENNE].
39 There seems to be no reason why the Court could not have decided the question
of admissibility in the preliminary phase of the case, proprio motu or otherwise. Had
the issue been formally raised, however, the question could have been joined to the
merits. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. Case, [1964] I.C.J. 6.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that even the majority of the Court in 1966 would
have found, had the Court expressly decided the question of admissibility in the pre-
liminary phase, that such determination would not be binding when the case reached
the merits.
40 South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. 336 (preliminary objections).
1967l
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The Respondent's contention runs counter to the natural
and ordinary meaning of the provisions of Article 7 of the
Mandate, which mentions "any dispute whatever" arising
between the Mandatory and another Member of the League
of Nations "relating to the interpretation or the application
of the provisions of the Mandate." The language used is
broad, clear and precise: it gives rise to no ambiguity and it
permits of no exception. It refers to any dispute whatever
relating not only to any one particular provision or pro-
visions, but to "the provisions" of the Mandate, obviously
meaning all or any provisions, whether they relate to sub-
stantive obligations of the Mandatory toward the inhabitants
of the Territory or toward the other Members of the League
or to its obligation to submit to supervision by the League
under Article 6 or to protection under Article 7 itself. For
the manifest scope and purport of the provisions of this
Article indicate that the Members of the League were under-
stood to have a legal right or interest in the observance by
the Mandatory of its obligations both toward the inhabitants
of the mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations
and its Members.4
The Doctrine of Res Judicata
An important question here is the effect that should be given to
the language quoted above concerning the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction and the meaning of the word "dispute" in Article 7. If
the Court's reasoning in 1962 on the nature of the Mandatory's legal
duties was not necessary to the question before it-the nature of
Article 7-then the language above is dictum and its only relevance is
as authority.'
Judge Koretsky argued in dissent that if the Court's conclusions
as to the other provisions were necessary to the 1962 judgment on
Article 7, they would be binding on the Court in 1966. Under
41 Id. at 343. (Emphasis added.) Compare the language of the joint dissent of
Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice.
To sum up, our study of the record confirms the view which we had
antecedently and independently formed, on the basis of the language of Article
7, and in the context of the Mandate as a whole. This view is, first, that
Article 7 must be understood as referring to a dispute in the traditional sense
of the term, as it would have been understood in 1920, namely a dispute be-
tween the actual parties before the Court about their own interests, in which
they appear as representing themselves and not some other entity or interest;
and secondly, that Article 7 in the general context and scheme of the Mandate,
was intended to enable the Members of the League to protect their own
rights and those of their nationals, and not to enable them to intervene in
matters affecting solely the conduct of the Mandate in relation to the peoples
of the mandated territory.
Id. at 558-59.
42 See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942).
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Koretsky's view, the preclusive effect of a judgment of the Court
not only pro obligatione habetur but also pro veritate.43 "And it can-
not be said that what today was for the Court a veritas, will tomorrow
be a non-veritas." ' The reasons necessary to the legal conclusions,
the consideranda, are thus binding on the Court.45 Authority for this
position on the scope of res judicata is found in Article 56 of the
Statute of the Court, which requires that "the judgment shall state
the reasons on which it is based." 46 The application of this rule in
the South West Africa cases requires a determination of whether the
assumption that there was a legal right in the applicants in the enforce-
ment of the "conduct" provisions was necessary to the Court's finding
in 1962 that there was a dispute within the meaning of Article 7, or
whether, on the contrary, this assumption went beyond the operative
part of the judgment. Koretsky asserted:
The reason of the 1962 Judgment relating to "a legal
right or interest" of the Applicants served as a ground for the
Court's decision to dismiss the third preliminary objection
submitted by the Respondent. And what was then decided
with the reasons "on which it is based" is finally not pro-
visionally decided. And I repeat that these reasons cannot
be reversed in the way chosen by the Court."
The language of the 1962 Court, however, might suggest that
the conclusion that the Applicants had a legal right or interest in the
obligations owed the inhabitants and the League by the Mandatory
43 Thus, the 1962 judgment is binding not only as to the finding of jurisdiction
to adjudicate on the merits, but also as to the reasons why there was such jurisdiction
in the Court. South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 240 (second phase).
44 Ibid.
4 5 Id. at 241. Support for Judge Koretsky's interpretation of res judicata is
found in the dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti in the Chorzow Factory (interpre-
tation) Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 13 (1927). In considering the principles of res
judicata in Article 59 and 60 of the Statute of the Court, Judge Anzilotti stated:
[We have here the three traditional elements of identification, persona,
petitum, causa petendi, for it is clear that "that particular case" (le cas qui a
Jtj decid) covers both the object and the grounds of the claim.
Id. at 23. Rosenne calls this case "the classic enunciation of the law" and notes that
res judicata has always been applied by the Court by reference to the Statute of the
Court, and not as a general principle of law under Article 38. 1 RoSENNE 624.
Compare Da Costa en Schaake N.V. v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration (Cour
de Justice de la Communit6 europ~ene) 2 CCH Comm. MKT. RFP. 8010, at 7240-45
(March 27, 1963) (conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange).
Judge Koretsky asserted:
The Judgment has not only a binding force between the parties (Article
59 of the Statute), it is final (Article 60 of the Statute). Being final, it is
-one may say-final for the Court itself unless revised by the Court under
the conditions and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 61
of the Statute and Article 78 of the Rules of the Court
South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 240 (second phase). Article 61 of the Statute
of the Court provides for revision within a certain time period only after the finding
of new facts. 1 ROSENNE 429.
4 6 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 241 (second phase).
4 7 Ibid.
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under the sacred trust was derived, not from an evaluation of the
provisions creating such substantive rights, but from the "provisions
of this Article"-meaning Article 7.8 If this be true, it is not wholly
correct to say that a finding of such a legal right or interest was neces-
sary to the finding of subject-matter jurisdiction in the body of
Article 7. In 1962, the Court viewed the substantive rights of the
Mandate as coextensive with the subject-matter jurisdiction of Article
7." This fact would lend support to the view that the 1962 Court
believed that in deciding the latter it was effectively deciding the
former. In this sense, the Court's assumption of the admissibility of
the claims was "necessary" to its disposition of the jurisdictional ques-
tion. Thus, Judge Koretsky's view appears sound, and the assumption
of admissibility should bind with a force equal to that of the 1962
judgment itself.
The procedure used by the Court in preserving for de novo con-
sideration the question of the admissibility of the claims was curious.
The Court relied on Article 62(3) of the Rules of the Court, which
provides that "Upon receipt by the Registrar of a preliminary objec-
tion filed by a party, the proceedings on the merits shall be sus-
pended . . . ." Thus, the only thing decided in 1962, it seems, is
that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the
claims. It is not clear what the Court would have done with Article
62 (3) had it decided expressly in 1962 that the claims were admissible,
even though the issue was not raised explicitly in the preliminary
objections. What is clear is that the Court believed that Article 62(3)
gave it license to disregard the substance of the judgment on the
preliminary objections."
The Court's view of the non-preclusiveness of a judgment on
preliminary objections, even putting aside objections to its legal founda-
tion, runs counter to the policies of having a rule of res judicata.
Nice questions of jurisprudence are presented. To what extent should
48 South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. 343 (preliminary objections).
49 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
50Judge Jessup dismissed this interpretation of Article 62(3). He noted that
the rule was intended to have a limited procedural purpose regarding time limits for
the proceedings on the merits and the obligations of parties to file written memorials;
the rule was not intended to derogate from principles of res judicata. South West
Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 334 (second phase).
61 The doctrine of res judicata precludes the parties from showing what is or
may be the truth. Why should not the truth prevail? The answer is based
upon public policy. The interests of the state and of the parties require the
putting of an end to controversies. One way of ending controversies is to
preclude the bringing of an action after a period of time has elapsed, and thus
a perfectly valid claim may be barred by a statute of limitations or by laches.
The policy against relitigation is even stronger. If the validity or invalidity
of a claim is established by a valid and final judgment, that claim cannot again
be litigated. If an issue is actually litigated and determined, that issue cannot
again be litigated between the parties even though it arises in an action based
upon a different claim.
Scott, -Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAgv. L. Rv. 1 (1942). See also Note,
Law of the Case, 40 CoLUM. L. Rzv. 268 (1940).
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any court in a subsequent proceeding vary from a correct result, in the
interest of following an incorrect judgment in deference to policies of
fairness and predictability? Is the answer to this question in any
way affected by the circumstances here, where changes in member-
ship of the panel resulted in the overturning of a bare majority by an
equally bare majority, and where the question presented in the latter
phase of the case is one intimately connected with, although seemingly
separate and distinct from, the decision already handed down? "
Probably one reason why the Court eschewed a strict rule of
res judicata was its sensitivity to the sovereignty of States. For, while
it might be appropriate for a municipal court to bind itself to an
erroneous decision in the interest of fairness and predictability, such
a result is perhaps unseemly where independent States have consented
to be bound by a decision of an international tribunal.' It should be
noted that redress in the courts is a departure from the normal manner
in which States conduct their affairs.
The Preclusiveness of the 1962 Judgment as a
Matter of Treaty Interpretation
It seems, then, that what the Court did in 1966 was merely to
insulate itself from the argument that it had already found that the
claims were admissible. It did this by praying in aid two rules: first,
that jurisdictional clauses are adjectival (procedural), not substantive
in nature; 54 second, that under Article 62(3) "a decision on a prelim-
inary objection can never be preclusive of a matter appertaining to
the merits, whether or not it has in fact been dealt with in connection
with the preliminary objection." 5'
Thus, the Court avoided the natural and ordinary meaning of the
broadly worded jurisdictional clause. It apparently assumed that the
intention of the parties to the Mandate, manifested in Article 7, shed
no light upon the parties' intent with regard to the legal content of the
other provisions of the Mandate." The Court's view of the matter,
then, comes down to this: even though the scope of the jurisdictional
2 These problems are exacerbated by the nature of the Court: the number of
judges, the length of tenure, the undue length of the proceedings and the fact that
the Court is one of first instance as well as last resort. The South West Africa
cases began November 4, 1960, and terminated July 18, 1966.
On the personnel of the Court, see generally, 1 ROSENNE 165-220. For an inter-
esting discussion of the composition of the Court and the disqualification of Judge
Zafrullah Kahn from the South West African Cases, see Reisman, Revision of the
South West Africa Cases, 7 VA. 3. INT'L L. 1, 42-59 (1966).
3 See Da Costa en Schaake N.V. v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration (Cour
de Justice de la Commnnit6 europ~ene), 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 118010, at 7240-45
(March 27, 1963) (conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange).
54 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 39 (second phase).
55 Id. at 37. Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942).
5 The Court in 1962 took the contrary view. See South West Africa Cases,
[1962] I.C.J. 343 (preliminary objections). See text accompanying notes 40-41, supra.
1182 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:1170
clause is sufficiently broad to cover the kind of claim presented-one
based on the non-material interests of the applicants-an analysis of
the Mandate reveals that the parties thereto never intended that the
Members of the League should have a legal right in the obligations
of the Mandatory to the inhabitants and to the League.
It is submitted, however, that if the 1962 judgment stands as
authoritative interpretation of Article 7, the holding of the Court in
1966 is erroneous. There is no reason to believe that parties who
wrote a jurisdictional clause to permit the Court, acting under the
Mandate, to hear cases involving the non-material interests of applicant
States, would have written an instrument in which the non-material
interests give rise only to inadmissible claims, that is, claims for which
the Court is powerless to grant relief.
The provisions of the Mandate-jurisdictional and substantive-
established obligations which were entered into simultaneously. The
only purpose of the jurisdictional clause was to afford an opportunity
for vindicating rights created in the Mandate. There was no reason
for drafting a jurisdictional clause broader than the legal rights
and duties created in the main body of the instrument. Whatever
may be the value of the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction
and admissibility of claims in other areas of the law, such distinction
is not sound in regard to the Mandate. To quote language used by
the Court in another context, but serviceable here, "those who in-
tended the one system cannot simultaneously have intended the other
... ) 5' Assuming that the 1962 judgment was an authoritative
reading of Article 7-and it does not appear that the Court argued to
the contrary-the 1966 judgment is erroneous as a matter of logical
interpretation of international conventions. Manifestly, the Court's
position runs afoul of the rule of effectiveness, ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.58
THE NATURE OF THE APPLICANTS' CLAIMS AND THE LEGAL
CONTENT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE MANDATE
One of the factors motivating the Court's decision may have
been the apparent difficulty of finding a sufficient legal standard in
Article 2 and a reluctance to expose the Mandatory to litigation with-
out such a standard. The duty stated in Article 2 is broad: "to
promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of the inhabitants of the territory." This duty, read
57 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 31 (second phase).
58 That the thing may have effect rather than be destroyed. Lauterpacht writes
that the rule of effectiveness "constitutes the main feature" of the opinion of the
Court in its opinion on International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128
(advisory opinion). LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 280 (1958). There, the Court's decision ensured the
continuation of the obligations created under the Mandate in spite of the fact that
the organ which had created and supervised the Mandate no longer existed.
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together with the first clause of Article 2-"The Mandatory shall have
full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject
to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South
Africa"-suggests that the discretionary power vested in the Man-
datory was broad as well. Not surprisingly, the Respondent argued
that the only actionable conduct under the Mandate would be conduct
in bad faith. 9
The way the various judges characterized the claims of the ap-
plicants seems to have determined, to some extent, how they evaluated
the legal content of Article 2. It is noteworthy, moreover, that
throughout the litigation of the case on the merits there was dis-
agreement as to the nature of the applicants' claims."° The majority
framed the question of admissibility thus:
[W]hether . . . any legal right or interest . . . was vested
in the members of the League of Nations, including the
present Applicants, individually and each in its own separate
right to call for the carrying out of the mandates as regards
their "conduct" clauses... 61
"To call for the carrying out of the mandates" is a phrase which con-
notes important legal consequences if the general power to carry out
&9 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 302.
60 This conflict between counsel for the applicants and the respondent resulted
in a dispute over the admission of testimony over the objections of the applicants.
Counsel for the applicants argued that the respondent's erroneous statement of the
applicants' contentions "formed an improper basis for the testimony of the witnesses."
Id. at 430. The position of the applicants was stated thus:
There are two major branches of the Applicants' case. One relates to
standards of interpretation which have been applied by competent international
organizations as part of the scheme of the Mandate. This involves the stand-
ard of interpretation, of a content described by the Applicants, in relation to
the supervisory organ responsible for the supervision of the Mandate, and
also involves the relationship between that administrative agency and the
Court. This branch of the case, therefore, reflects and is based upon a legal
theory, which involves the mandate jurisprudence, which involves the clear,
explicit and virtually unanimous pronouncements and judgments of the com-
petent international organ which the Applicants submit for reasons which
have been set forth in detail, should be accepted by the Court as authoritative
interpretations of the Mandate. It is apartheid we are talking about. If this
witness or any other witness addresses himself as an expert or otherwise to
the questions of discrimination and separation which are implicit in and
reflected in the undisputed facts of record in this case, there would be no
question of admissibility of such evidence so directed by competent witnesses
with respect to that branch of the Applicants' case.
And, secondly, Mr. President, with respect to the norm, the rule of inter-
national law for which the Applicants contend in terms of Article 38 of the
Statute-that, as the Court will well be aware, has been presented to the
Court as an alternative and a cumulative, or supplemental, argument on the
basis that the practice of States and the views of the competent international
organs are so clear, so explicit, and so unanimous in respect of the policies
against discrimination, that such standards have achieved the status of an
international rule of law, as a legal conclusion based upon the application of
Article 38.
Id. at 431.
61 Id. at 22.
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the mandates is discretionary; it suggests an encroachment upon such
discretionary power. It is far different from seeking a declaration on
the validity of a particular course of action in the light of objective
standards of interpretation found in the Mandate (Judge Jessup's char-
acterization) ; ' it is far different, moreover, from a petition for an
injunction against, or declaration of the illegality of, those actions of
the Mandatory which violate international norms (Judge Tanaka's
characterization) .
Under the majority's view, the Court was being asked to interfere
with the administration of the mandated Territory; it was being
asked to decide moral, political and social questions; ultimately, it was
being asked to evaluate the utility of one social order as opposed to
another. It is arguable that it was for the Mandatory to decide upon
the efficacy of various social systems. To institute a new social policy
against the will of the Mandatory, perhaps, would have required a
political or administrative judgment not within the competence of the
Court; 4 such a judgment, on the other hand, was clearly within the
competence of the League Council which, before its dissolution, had
dealt with such questions.
Judges Jessup and Tanaka, in their dissenting opinions,
6 5 saw
no attempt by the applicants to foist upon the respondent one social
6 Id. at 328.
63 See text accompanying notes 74-83 infra.
64 To say that an issue before the Court is not justiciable because it turns on a
"political" question in a sense assumes the conclusion. A question is "political" when
the parties engaged in the dispute have not assented to be bound by judicial power
in regard thereto. The subjects of municipal lav are generally amenable to judicial
process; there is a defined notion of sovereignty. In the international sphere, how-
ever, there is no defined sovereign to which all nations are subject. To the extent
that there is no expressed intent to be bound by the rule of law, all questions are
political. The thrust of the legal theory of positivism suggests that international
disputes are presumptively political. To state that the duty of Article 2 of the Man-
date is political merely means that the Mandatory has not assumed a legal obligation,
not, as might be suggested, that the obligations of Article 2 are in some way inherently
political.
The function of the "political question" in American law, it should be noted, also
involves questions of sovereignty, that is, the relationship between the competing
branches of the federal government or between the federal government and the states.
Such a technique for not deciding questions before the courts, applied in the inter-
national context, has a different effect-it militates against the development of the
rule of law among equal subjects.
05 An interesting collateral issue raised in the South West Africa Cases is the
permissible scope of separate and dissenting opinions. President Judge Spender con-
tended that when the Court's opinion is limited to an issue short of the ultimate
merits of the case, judges writing separate and dissenting opinions should be similarly
limited. [1966] I.C.J. 51-57. Apparently this was an effort by the judge to restrain,
in future decisions, opinions such as that of Judge Van Wyk, the ad hoc judge from
South Africa, who wrote an extensive apology for the policy of apartheid, [1966]
I.C.J. 67-215 (second phase), and those of the dissenting judges.
Judge Jessup spoke to the issue of the scope of opinions before a group of students
of the Academy of International Law at the Hague, the Netherlands, on July 16,
1966. He noted that those who constituted the Court made the decision to adopt the
common-law method of permitting concurring and dissenting opinions, rather than
the civil law approach where the court speaks with one voice. The value of dis-
senting opinions, said the Judge-who referred to Lauterpacht on this subject, see
LAUTERPAcET, supra note 58, at 66-70--was two-fold: first, it encouraged the parties
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system in preference to another because of moral, social or political
reasons per se. They argued that the Mandatory's conduct could be
judged according to appropriate legal standards. Judge Jessup found
a sufficient objective standard in the duty stated in Article 2 "to
promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social
progress of the inhabitants." "' He asserted the existence of a con-
temporary standard of interpretation recognized by the international
community according to which the Court might judge whether the
Mandatory had fulfilled its obligations under Article 2. He relied
for his principle of interpretation upon the resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly.
[M]y conclusion does not rest upon the thesis that resolutions
of the General Assembly have a general legislative character
and by themselves create new rules of law. But the accumu-
lation of expressions of condemnation of apartheid as repro-
duced in the pleadings of the Applicants in this case, espe-
cially as recorded in the resolutions of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, are proof of the pertinent contempo-
rary international community standard."7
He conceived of the applicants' claims as prayers for a declaratory
judgment on the legality of apartheid in the light of this standard of
interpretation. He stated: "The law abounds in examples of standards
or criteria which are applied by courts as tests of human conduct." "
to come before the court because of the knowledge that the position of the losing party
might be vindicated by an exposition written by a dissenting judge; second, a well-
reasoned dissenting opinion could itself contribute to the development of the law, by
charting a course which the court might take in the future. Judge Jessup referred,
as an illustration (and indirectly and perhaps unwittingly an indication of what was
to come two days later) of this characteristic of the common-law method, to two
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, NAACP v. Overstreet, 384
U.S. 118 (1966) (Mem.); Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966)
(Mem.), in which, although the decision of the Court was to dismiss certiorari as
improvidently granted, fully-reasoned dissenting opinions were written on the merits.
The 1966 judgment of the International Court resembles a dismissal of certiorari as
improvidently granted in that it suggests a "now-you-see-it, now-you-don't?' refusal
to hear a case on the merits.
06 Id. at 433.
67Id. at 441. See generally Asamoah, The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the
General Assembly, 3 CoLum. J. oF TRANSNAT'L L. 210 (1965). Judge Jessup rebutted
the view that the Mandatory could not be exposed to standards of international law,
albeit standards of interpretation, that did not exist at the time that the Mandate was
entered into. He noted that the purpose of the "sacred trust of civilization" stated
in Article 22 of the Covenant was t:, help the inhabitants of the mandated territories
to "stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." The
Court's view that the obligations under the Mandate must be interpreted as they were
understood in 1920 is not gainsaid by arguing that the term "modern world" was
intended to be a dynamic concept, changing according to the social needs of the day.
Thus, the parties should not be presumed to have intended in 1966, when the Man-
date was still in effect, that the duty of the Mandatory stopped at bringing the
inhabitants into the world of 1920. Consequently, contemporary international stand-
ards of interpretation--even, arguably, international norms-might be invoked in order
to define the Mandatory's duties under the Mandate. Id. at 439-40.
6s South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 434 (second phase).
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Judge Jessup noted that the standard of interpretation was but
one half of the applicant's case. The other was an alleged norm of
international law proscribing racial discrimination, which is evidenced
in and created by the practice of States and the pronouncements of
competent international organs0 9 Although Judge Jessup took issue
with this latter part of the applicants' case,7" Judge Tanaka took up the
argument of the applicants for a norm of international law, binding
upon the Mandatory, which establishes the illegality of racial
discrimination.
Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion merits detailed consideration
because it offers a sharply contrasting and well-reasoned alternative
to the Court's interpretation of the obligations created by the instru-
ment of mandate. He first considered the difficulty of evaluating the
substance of the Mandatory's obligations without sufficient legal
standards, suggesting that perhaps the creators and draftsmen of
Article 22 and the Mandate did not fully consider the problems in-
herent in the obligations stated in Article 2, paragraph 2 of the
Mandate:
[W]e are inclined to conclude that the concept of the pro-
motion of "material and moral well-being and social progress
of the inhabitants" which constitutes the objectives of the
Mandate for South West Africa (Article 2, paragraph 2),
is in itself of political character and cannot be recognized as
susceptible of judicial determination and execution21
But this fact, according to the judge, does not mean that Article 2,
paragraph 2 does not constitute a legal norm. He then described the
process whereby a cultural or political norm is vested with "juridical
value"-the process of "naturalization." '  Such is the case, he
asserted, with regard to the obligation of Article 2.
Judge Tanaka admitted that it is fundamentally correct to say that
in the area of discretionary power, an issue is justiciable only if the
Mandatory acts in bad faith.73 He then turned, however, to the ap-
plicants' amendment of their Submission No. 4 with the insertion of
the phrase "in the light of applicable international standards or inter-
national legal norm." Thereby, he said:
69Id. at 432.
7 oId. at 432-33.
71 Id. at 281.
Briefly, to promote the well-being and the progress of the inhabitants,
many policies and measures are conceivable. The Mandatory has a discretion-
ary power to choose those it considers to be the most appropriate and efficient
means of realizing the said objectives of the Mandate.
Id. at 282.
7Id. at 281.
73 Id. at 283.
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Applicants' cause is no longer based directly on a violation
of the well-being and progress by the practice of apartheid,
but on the alleged violation of certain international standards
or international legal norm and not directly on the obligation
to promote the well-being and social progress of the in-
habitants. There is no doubt that, if such standards and
norm exist, their observance in itself may constitute part of
Respondent's general obligations to promote the well-being
and social progress.74
Thus, the alleged norm or standards pleaded in applicants' submissions
constitute a limitation on the Mandatory's discretionary power under
Article 2.
What then is the source of the international norm or standards
which are incorporated in the Mandatory's general obligations as a
limit upon its discretionary power? Judge Tanaka found such a norm
in three sources of international law contained in Article 38 of the
Statute of the Court. First, the norm of non-discrimination binds
the respondent as part of the Charter of the United Nations; this is a
norm of conventional international law under Article 38(1) (a) of the
Statute of the Court.7" Second, Judge Tanaka found such a norm as
part of customary international law under Article 38(1) (b), relying on
the repetition of resolutions and declarations of international organs.76
Finally, Judge Tanaka found the norm of non-discrimination
among "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
under Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of the Court. Such "general prin-
ciples" include not only basic principles of law, but also general theories
of law, fundamental legal concepts, as well as "juridical truth." 77 In
74Id. at 286.
75 The Charter, being of the nature of special international law, or the law
of the organized international community, must be applied to all matters which
come within the purposes and competence of the United Nations and with
which member States are concerned, including the matter of the Mandate.
Logic requires that, so long as we recognize the unity of personality, the same
principle must govern both the conduct of a member State in the United
Nations itself and also its conduct as a mandatory, particularly in the matter
of the protection and guarantee of human rights and freedoms.
Id. at 290.
70 This collective, cumulative and organic process of custom-generation can
be characterized as the middle way between legislation by convention and
the traditional process of custom making, and can be seen to have an important
role from the viewpoint of the development of international law.
Id. at 292. This norm of customary international law, moreover, binds the Mandatory
both in its capacity as a member of the United Nations and by way of interpretation
of Article 2 of the Mandate. Id. at 293.
Judge Tanaka viewed this generation of custom as:
. . . nothing other than a simple clarification of what was not so clear 40 years
ago. What ought to have been clear 40 years ago has been revealed by the
creation of a new customary law which plays the role of authentic interpre-
tation the effect of which is retroactive.
Id. at 294.
77 Id. at 295.
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this context he distinguished general principles which are "private
law principles found by the comparative law method and applicable by
way of analogy to matters of an international character." " Such
principles, common to all nations, are "of the character of jus
gentum." " In addition, Judge Tanaka argued that Article 38(1) (c)
embodies principles of the character of jus naturale8  In regard to
those general principles of law applicable to the international situation
by way of analogy, he considered well-founded respondent's contention
that
the alleged norm of non-differentiation as between individuals
within a State on the basis of membership of a race, class or
group could not be transferred by way of analogy to the
international relationship, otherwise it would mean that all
nations are to be treated equally despite the difference of
race, colour, etc.-a conclusion which is absurd."'
The natural law principle of non-discrimination, however, neither
depends on analogy nor on the consent of the nations subject to it.'
Evidence of the recognition of such a general principle is found in the
constitutions of most of the civilized nations as well as in the declara-
tions of the organs of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and
other international bodies.
Judge Tanaka then stated the claims of the applicants in regard
to the alleged norm:
What the Applicants seek to establish seems to be that the
Respondent's practice of apartheid constitutes a violation of
international standards and/or an international legal norm,
namely the principle of equality and, as a result, a violation
of the obligations to promote to the utmost, etc. If the
violation of this principle exists, this will be necessarily fol-
lowed by failure to promote the well-being, etc. The ques-
tion is whether the principle of equality is applicable to the
relationships of the mandate or 
not!3
78 Id. at 295-96.
79 Id. at 296.
80 Ibid.
81 Id. at 296.
82 Judge Tanaka stated that Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of the Court con-
stitutes a compromise between the naturalists and the positivists, thus allowing for the
application of natural law among the "general principles." Id. at 299. He also cited
2 ROSENNE 610:
Having independent existence, their validity as legal norms does not
derive from the consent of the parties as such .... The Statute places this
element on a footing of formal equality with two positivist elements of custom
and treaty, and thus is positivist recognitions [sic] of the Grotian concept
of the coexistence implying no subjugation of positive law and so-called
natural law of nations in the Grotian sense.
s3 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 301 (second phase).
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He answered this question summarily:
We consider that the principle of equality, although
it is not expressly mentioned in the mandate instrument
constitutes, by its nature, an integral part of the mandates
system and therefore is embodied in the Mandate. From the
natural-law character of this principle its inclusion in the
Mandate must be justified.'
Having concluded that the principle of equality or non-discrimination
is applicable to the obligations included in Article 22 of the Covenant
and Article 2 of the Mandate, Judge Tanaka considered the substance of
this principle in the context of its alleged violation by the respondent:
The divergence of views between the parties is sum-
marized in the following formula: whether or not the policy
of racial discrimination or separate development is per se
incompatible with the well-being and social progress of the
inhabitants, or in other terms, whether the policy of apartheid
is illegal and constitutes a breach of the Mandate, or depends
upon the motive (bona fides or mai fides), the result or
effect. From the Respondent's standpoint apartheid is not
per se prohibited but only a special kind of discrimination
which leads to oppression is prohibited.'
Consequently, the applicant's position was that evidence of the
effect or the practice of apartheid and the conditions within the man-
dated territory was not relevant to their submissions, whereas the
respondent introduced testimony in support of the defense of the lack
of bad faith and the allegation that apartheid had not led to oppression. 6
In addition, the respondent urged the necessity of different treatment
for diverse population groups for the purpose of promoting the well-
being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory."
For the content of his natural law principle of equality, Judge
Tanaka turned to the Aristotelian concepts of justitia commutativa
and justitia distributiva and concluded: "The principle is that what
is equal is to be treated equally and what is different is to be treated
differently, namely, proportionately to the factual difference." s Fur-
41bid.
851d. at 302.
86 See note 60 supra.
87 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 307 (second phase).
88Id. at 305.
The most fundamental point in the equality principle is that all human
beings as persons have an equal value in themselves, that they are the aim
itself and not means for others, and that, therefore, slavery is denied. The
idea of equality of men as persons and equal treatment as such is of a meta-
physical nature. It underlies all modern, democratic and humanitarian law
systems as a principle of natural law.
Ibid.
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thermore, different treatment is permitted "only when it can be
justified by the criterion of justice," or by the concept of reasonableness
as developed by Anglo-Saxon law.'
Judge Tanaka thus concluded that discrimination on the basis of
race renders the policy of apartheid violative of the principle of equality
because it does not take into account concrete individual circumstances.
Apartheid constitutes a violation of Article 2, paragraph 2 of the
Mandate because "the observance of the principle of equality before
the law must be considered as a necessary condition of the promotion
of the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the
inhabitants of the territory." 'o
CONCLUSION
The difference between the majority of the Court and the dis-
senting judges is essentially a clash between two theories of inter-
pretation. The Court employs a contractual approach; that is, it
interprets the obligations under the mandate instrument restrictively.
9
The Court is loathe to subject the Mandatory to obligations which it
did not assume expressly and unequivocally. At every turn, the goal
is to limit the duties placed upon the Mandatory. Indeed, the Court's
handling of the issue of the preclusive effect of the 1962 judgment on
the preliminary objections evinces the spirit of voluntarism. The
Court sacrifices the ideals of the Mandates System to the principles
of State sovereignty in a context where such sovereignty was to be
the servant of humanitarian ideals.
89 Id. at 306. In separating the reasonable discrimination from the unreasonable,
Judge Tanaka considered the different treatment under the Minorities treaties by which
the respondent sought to justify its own policy of different treatment. Under the
Minorities treaties, however, different treatment was a means to cultural survival with-
out the deprivation of rights and privileges enjoyed by the majority, and therefore the
spirit of these treaties was "not negative and prohibitive, but positive and permissive."
d. at 307. The examples of reasonable different treatment, e.g., the Minorities treaties,
proved to Judge Tanaka that the applicants' contention that apartheid is per se violative
of the international norm of equality was not supportable, to the extent that it would
not permit an exception to the norm.
Equality being a principle and different treatment an exception, those
who refer to the different treatment must prove its raison d'etre and its
reasonableness.
The Applicants' norm of non-discrimination or non-separation, being con-
ceived as of a per se nature, would appear not to permit any exception. The
policy of apartheid or separate development which allots status, rights, duties,
privileges or burdens on the basis of membership in a group, class or race
rather than on the basis of individual merit, capacity or potential is illegal
whether the motive be bona fide or lunaa fide, oppressive or benevolent;
whether its effect or result be good or bad for the inhabitants.
Id. at 309.
O Id. at 314.
91 Lauterpacht notes that the rule of restrictive interpretation results from a
desire to protect the sovereignty of States. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation
and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 48, 57-58 (1949). Judge Tanaka claimed that the method of the majority
constituted "strict juristic formalism." South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 276
(second phase).
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The method of Judge Tanaka, on the other hand, may be termed
functional or teleological. The teleological approach is in a sense the
maxim ut res nagis valeat quam pereat writ large. The purpose here
is to give effect to the function that the Mandates System was to
serve. Thus, he found in the Mandate an "existence independent of
the original or ulterior intent of the parties." 2 It is this intent, more-
over, independent of the original intent of the parties, that gives the
Mandate an institutional as well as a contractual nature. This insti-
tutional side of the Mandates System was recognized in the Advisory
Opinion on the Status of South West Africa in 1950 and the 1962
judgment. Both decisions held that the Mandate survived the dis-
solution of the League, one of the parties to the international
"contract." 93
The teleological method of interpretation considers the "spirit
and objectives as well as social reality" of the Mandates System.'
There is a sense that the obligations assumed by the Mandatory
should be enforced in order to fulfill the goals of the system-to pro-
vide for the welfare of the inhabitants of the Territory who are not
themselves subjects of international law-even in the absence of a
common intention of the parties on the subject of whether the members
of the League were to have a substantive right in the performance
of the "sacred trust." This smacks of a theory of "necessity," and is,
92 Ibid. The problem here is the lacuna of legislative intent regarding the ad-
missibility of claims based on the "conduct!' provisions. The goal of interpretation is
to discern the common intention of the parties. Lauterpacht writes:
For the contingency must be envisaged that in many cases the common inten-
tion of the parties is an assumption rather than a reality for some such reasons
as that the parties while using identical language did not intend the same
thing; or that one party deliberately used language of ambiguity; or that both
parties, being unable to reach agreement.
LAU=ERPACHT, supra note 58, at 229. Lauterpacht had written earlier that where:
there was no common intention of the parties to adopt a positive and clear-cut
solution on the particular subject-it is the right and duty of international
judicial and arbitral agencies to impart an effect to these clauses by reference
to the purpose of the treaty as a whole and to other relevant considerations,
including the finality of adjudication.
Lauterpacht, mtpra note 91, at 78.
Judge Tanaka writes of the teleological method:
Such attitude of interpretation has been known as a method of "libre
recherche scientifique" or "Freirecht", mainly in civil law countries for three-
quarters of a century as emancipating judges from the rigid interpretation
of written laws and emphasizing the creative role in their judicial activities.
There is no reason to believe that the same method should be denied in the
field of international law except the opposing tendency of strong voluntarism
derived from the concept of sovereignty and not being in conformity with the
concept of law which attributes to law an objective and independent existence
from the will and intention of those to whom law is addressed.
In short the difference of opinions on the questions before us is in the
final instance attributed to the difference between two methods of interpre-
tation: teleological or sociological and conceptional or formalistic.
South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 278 (second phase).
Schwarzenberger warns that "the functional method is apt to degenerate into
legislation in disguise." 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLuD By
INTENATIONAL COURTS AND TRou ALS 517 (3d ed. 1957).
93 See text accompanying notes 7-14 mepra.
94 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 276 (second phase).
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not surprisingly, anathema to the majority of the Court. Of course,
this is not to say that there is no support for the applicants under a
more modest approach to treaty interpretation. The plain meaning
rule as applied to Article 7 and a sensitivity to the purpose of the
instrument might well lead to a conclusion that the parties to the
Mandate conceived of a legal right in the members of the League in
the "conduct" provisions. 5
Such an inference, if it be that, in the absence of explicit language,
would, in the eyes of strict legal positivists, suggest treaty revision and
judicial legislation. There is, to be sure, a sensitive area, not unknown
to common law judges, where adjudication and legislation commingle.
In writing of the principle of effectiveness and the significance of the
common intention of the parties, Sir Hersh Lauterpacht noted that:
"It touches upon one of the most controversial and elusive problems of
jurisprudence-the nature and the limits of the judicial function."
Judge Tanaka spoke candidly to this very point:
Undoubtedly a court of law declares what is the law,
but does not legislate. In reality, however, where the
borderline can be drawn is a very delicate and difficult matter.
Of course, judges declare the law, but they do not function
automatically. We cannot deny the possibility of some
degree of creative element in their judicial activities. What
is not permitted to judges, is to establish law independently
of an existing legal system, institution or norm. What is
permitted to them is to declare what can be logically inferred
from the raison-d'etre of a legal system, legal institution or
norm. In the latter case the lacuna in the intent of legislation
or parties can be filled."1
Part of the argument against finding a common intention of the
parties to confer the kind of substantive rights here asserted was "the
95 There is reason to believe, as did the Court in 1962, that the broadly worded
compromissory clause of Article 7 of the Mandate was itself a manifestation of the
intention of the parties to confer upon the members of the League the kind of sub-
stantive rights urged by the applicants. Judge Wellington Koo adopted this view in
his dissenting opinion in 1966:
The broad, plain and comprehensive language of the provision implies that
the content and scope of the legal right or interest of the Members of the
League of Nations is co-extensive with the obligations of the Mandatory under
the Mandate; it is not restricted to the content of the said Article 5.
If it were to be interpreted as so limited, such interpretation would obvi-
ously be incompatible with the all-embracing term "the provisions of the
Mandate". If it had been intended by the authors of the instrument to be
so restricted in meaning and content, it would have been a simple thing to
mention "Article 5" instead of the actual term "the provisions of the Mandate"
-as stated in the compromissory clause. There is a Chinese proverb put in
the form of a question: Why write a long and big essay on such a small
subject?
Id. at 219-20.
96 Lauterpacht, mipra note 91, at 82.
97 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.CJ. 277 (second phase).
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state of development of the concept and institution of compulsory
jurisdiction in the period of the early twenties and the general re-
luctance to assume such an extensive and onerous obligation." "s But,
on the contrary, the Mandates System, indeed the League itself, was
a new kind of institution imbued with the hopes and idealism of a
new era. Judge Wellington Koo, writing in dissent, pointed out that
the Mandates System was not the only manifestation of a new order
of legal rights and duties. The Constitution of the International
Labor Organization and the minorities treaties conferred substantive
rights in the absence of traditional material interests."
The very language of the Mandate and of the Covenant conveys
the idea that, at least in regard to the territories in which the in-
habitants were unable to stand by themselves, the material interests
of States should take a position subordinate to those of the indigenous
population. This was a "sacred trust of civilization." The release by
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of their traditional rights
of annexation in regard to these territories constituted a unique re-
nunciation of material self-interest. One should not conclude, therefore,
that it was the intention of the parties to the mandates to supplant the
material interests of several States with the material interests of one
State-the Mandatory-save as a means of insuring that the welfare
of the inhabitants be secured.
The rights of the Mandatory in relation to the mandated
territory and the inhabitants have their foundation in the
obligations of the Mandatory and they are, so to speak, mere
tools given to enable it to fulfill its obligations. The fact is
that each Mandate under the Mandates System constitutes
a new international institution, the primary, overriding pur-
pose of which is to promote "the well-being and development"
of the people of the territory under the Mandate.' 0
With this conception of the Mandate in mind, it is difficult to
support a theory of interpretation that limits the duties of the Man-
datory to the specific terms of the instrument, construed with the
begrudging fastidiousness used to interpret an international contract,
to the detriment of the inhabitants, for whose benefit the Mandate
was created. The nature of the mandate instrument is not the same
as that of the traditional kind of treaty, bilateral or multilateral, in
which the only parties in interest are the high contracting parties-
sovereign States. The unique feature of the Mandates System was
the effectuation of rights of third parties, not subjects of international
law, incapable of independently vindicating their own rights. In this
98 Id. at 226.
99 Ibid.
loo South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.Cj. 329 (preliminary objections).
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respect, it is no answer that the administration of the mandates was
to be overseen by the League Council, for it is undisputed that because
of the unanimity rule, the Council could never have protected effec-
tively the interests of the inhabitants of the mandated territories
against the powers of an irresponsible mandatory. Therefore, to the
extent that the goals of the Mandates System are defeated by a theory
of interpretation giving primacy to the sovereignty of a State occupy-
ing the subject territory by the grace of that institution, the decision
of the Court rests upon an inappropriate principle of law, since the in-
terests of the Mandatory were intended to be subordinate to those of the
inhabitants of the Territory. This fact was expressly noted by the
Court in 1950:
The authority which the Union Government exercises
over the Territory is based on the Mandate. If the Mandate
lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's au-
thority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights
derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations there-
under could not be justified.1'
Ironically and erroneously, the decision of the Court in 1966
affirmed in the Union of South Africa all the rights granted pursuant
to the Mandate while effectively denying the obligations owed the
inhabitants of South West Africa. The Court has chosen a theory
of interpretation and a set of norms and standards inappropriate for
and insensitive to the purposes of the instrument before it." 2
1O1International Status of South West Africa, [19501 I.C.J. 133 (advisory
opinion). (Emphasis added.)
1020n October 27, 1966 "The [United Nations] General Assembly proclaimed
. . . the termination of South Africa's mandate over South West Africa." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 28, 1966, p. 1, col. 4.
